By

P. Raman

The UPA government has perfected a familiar pattern of crisis management in Parliament. Began with the bitter confrontation in July 2008, and repeated during the cut motion this year, the model has been fairly successful.

It was tried this month again with adequate care in the case of the nuclear liability bill. It proved third time a bit unlucky.  The significant aspect of the model is a clear separation of the party establishment and the government managers. Congress MPs vote with the government on final signals from the party establishment, which avoids an active role in government’s problems. Such a tight separation is something amusing. Take the bitter battle of July 22, 2008.  Even in the first week of July, the party was reluctant to snap ties with the Left. The MPs chosen to speak did defend the government’s position. Yet the lack of commitment and involvement was writ large on their face. 

Even while the debate was on, many MPs grumbled about the wisdom of the government’s rigid posture. Any other political party might have launched a massive public campaign in support of the government.  But the Congress avoided it.  The second trend has been the role of the non-political actors from the stage of formulating policies to drawing up the game plans to rope in groups like the Samajwadi Party. In 2008, persons in the PM's camp did try deal making. This time that was missing.  

The whole operation was carried out by non-political aides, mostly retired bureaucrats reappointed at crucial posts. Pranab Mukherjee’s assistance is crucial for pushing things ahead and earn the backing of the party establishment. However, this time final negotiations were left to ‘in-house’ talent Prithviraj Chavan, minister of state in PMO. Congress MPs or ministerial colleagues had little involvement in mobilising support. Some feel they are kept out due to a trust deficit.

The Congress has a reservoir of tested leaders - many of them in cabinet - who have performed challenging tasks within the organisation and government under other PMs. They had grabbed initiatives under Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao. Under Vajpayee, persons like Pramod Mahajan, Jaswant Singh, Arun Jaitley and Sushma Swaraj were ever ready to conduct public campaigns and trouble-shooting for the NDA government. Barring Vajpayee’s old friend, Brijesh Mishra, no non-political actors had worked in the shadows.  

The real strength of the UPA dispensation has been the sustenance it derives from the powerful corporate and foreign lobbies. In 1997, L.K. Advani had emphasised the critical nature of such backup. He had said, no government could survive without the protection of this twin-force. Those who dare to alienate them or refuse to look after their minimum interests will lose the job. This was Advani’s main argument to jettison the swadeshis within the RSS Parivar and the BJP, who were then holding out. The presence of such forces was overbearing in all three confrontations the government had encountered.  

The system perfected under the UPA can be a survival model for governments in functional democracies. The lobby power about which Obama bemoans is just one aspect of this well-orchestrated project. In its scope and reach, no politician, however ingenious, could possibly conceive of and operationalise such an elaborate mission. A successful experiment in public opinion building and producing legislative majority, it deserves a deep study by experts. Comprehensive planning and execution by centres is the essence to its success. 

Media as the main instrument, diplomats and statesmen, corporate honchos and business associations, influential foreign players, and government enforcement agencies play a crucial role in this massive operation, which calls for considerable democratic engineering. In the 2008 standoff, the media facilitated the process by carefully dumping down or shutting off the adverse versions of the nuclear deal controversy. Reports, regular writers and opinion pages created a favourable ambiance.  Experts, domestic and foreign, added to the public opinion buildup.

The business lobbies began putting pressures on the vulnerable opposition groups. L.K. Advani, though shorn of much of the powers, had lent support to the India-US nuclear deal at least thrice - each time after meetings with US dignitaries or domestic corporates. And each time the party had publicly disowned his views. One can imagine the kind of arm twisting needed to get a person like Mulayam Singh Yadav to lend support to a move which he had consistently opposed. Later, the same tool was used to bring round the SP and the RJD on the issue of the cut motion.  

On the liability bill, the same pattern was tried. Media push, corporate and foreign pressures were put on the BJP. This time a rather novel idea was the orchestrated views of the PSUs and domestic firms telling the opposition that any ‘burden’ on suppliers will affect them. This failed because of two reasons. Instead of the standing committee on power headed by an SP MP, the government handed the work to one headed by a Congress MP. This trust deficit angered Mulayam Singh. At last minute, the government found the time was too short to win over the Yadavs.

Hence the early end of the monsoon session and the compulsions of passing the bill before the Obama visit in November forced the government to take to the next best option. It agreed to the changes suggested by the BJP but tried to dilute it by stealth. An infuriated BJP insisted on the changes, which were finally passed. The US suppliers are not happy. They fear the law can be subjected to too many interpretations. Business circles fear the new clause will lead to a higher insurance burden. Is PM’s pat for the BJP for its cooperation too premature?